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I. INTRODUCTION
The premise of this essay is that the modem administrative state's need for
discretion and flexibility and its tendency to govern through emergency have a
discernable impact on the structure of criminal procedure doctrine in the United
States. The current War on Terror that fully emerged after September 11, 2001
increases the desire for discretion and flexibility and influences the course of
doctrine, but it has not changed doctrine in any fundamental way.'
Building on that premise, my goal is to explore how the development of
criminal procedure doctrines over the last three decades or so reflects and assists a
way of governing a state and its citizens, a process that responds to but also
transcends particular events such as the War on Drugs or the War on Terror. The
scope and tone of this exploration draws on the work of a great many people: Carol
Steiker on the preventive state; 2 Bill Stuntz on privacy, policing, and criminal
justice;3 Jonathan Simon on governing through crime;4 Markus Dubber on the
police power in its broader senses; 5 and a host of people writing in what might
loosely be called governmentality studies.6 In the approach to criminal procedure
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I am grateful for the comments of Joshua
Dressler and Alan Michaels, and for the comments and questions I received when I presented earlier
versions of this essay at the 2008 AALS Annual Meeting in New York, and the Second Global
Conference on Evil, Law and the State in Salzburg.
1 For the argument in favor of this premise, see John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New
Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2007).
2 Carol Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CIuM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 771
(1998).
3 E.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002);
William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter Stuntz,
Privacy's Problem], 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016 (1995).
4 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR IN CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
5 MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GovERNmENT (2005); see also THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL GovERNANE (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2006).
6 E.g., Nikolas Rose, Pat O'Malley & Mariana Valverde, Governmentality, 2 ANN. REv. L. &
Soc. Sc. 83 (2006). The term derives from a lecture by Michel Foucault published under the title
"Governmentality" in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALTY 87 (Graham Burchell
et al. eds., 1991). A more accurate version appears in MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY,
POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLtGE DE FRANCE, 1977-1978 [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SECURITY]
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doctrine that I sketch, flexible but meaningful rights are integrated into flexible but
professional police practices, with the goal of allowing careful calibration by
private individuals and government officials of the various interests that are at play
in a modem, liberal, administrative state. At this stage, my effort is primarily
descriptive; I do not develop a full justification or criticism of the doctrinal
direction that I discern, and attaining the distance necessary for such an assessment
is likely to be difficult.
This essay begins the exploration of these themes by focusing on two pairs of
Fourth Amendment cases. The first case in each pair was decided before
September 11, 2001, and the second was decided after that date. The first pair-
Tennessee v. Garner7 and Scott v. Harris8 -concerns the law of excessive force,
while the second pair-Florida v. Bostick9 and United States v. Draytonl°-
examines consent to search in the context of bus sweeps. Both pairs exhibit a
combination of change and continuity in criminal procedure doctrine under the
influence of the War on Terror, ongoing concerns about national security, and
general anxiety about public order.1 In particular, concerns about terrorism give a
sharper edge to the analysis in the later opinions and may provoke statements from
the Justices that go further or are more revealing than they otherwise would have
been. But in all four cases (except, to some extent, Tennessee v. Garner) the clear
focus is on using the idea of reasonableness to expand police discretion.'
2
Even more, the relationship between the police and citizens in these cases
emerges as a central site for the articulation of how ideas about state power,
freedom, and rights operate in practice, such that police power and discretion help
constitute citizenship, and the assertion of rights gives shape to discretion and
87 (Graham Burchell trans., 2007).
7 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
8 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
9 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
'0 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
11 Other pairings are possible, such as the dog sniff cases (United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983), and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)), and the road block cases (Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004)), but I do not think they
would change my general conclusions.
12 Reasonableness is, of course, the touchstone of Fourth Amendment doctrine as a matter of
text, particularly for official conduct that does not require a warrant, but it has also become the
template for interpreting constitutional rights in relationship to governmental power. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987) ("The fact is that, regardless of the terminology used, the
precise content of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties guarantees rests upon an assessment of
what accommodation between governmental need and individual freedom is reasonable...."); Parry,
supra note 1, at 800-02 (discussing the move from rights as rules to rights as the product of a
balancing test). For extensive discussions of this dynamic, see Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House
Divided: How the Supreme Court Dismantled the Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33
(2005); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 119 (1989).
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police power.' 3 Further, by making decisions about their interactions with the
police-decisions such as whether to flee or whether to consent to a search-
people exercise political power within a model of governance that
"instrumentalize[s] and shape[s] various forms of freedom and choice."'
14
II. REASONABLE FORCE AND CONSENT BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
A. The Excessive Force Cases: Garner and Harris
In Tennessee v. Garner,'5 the Supreme Court held, first, that apprehension of
a fleeing felon through deadly force is a Fourth Amendment seizure and, second,
that deadly force may not be used on an unarmed fleeing felon-in this case a
burglar-unless "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." 16 The
Court reached this conclusion through the familiar balancing of individual and
governmental interests. 17 Importantly, in assessing the government's interests, the
Court relied on police professionalism, evidenced in this case by the adoption of
policies in many jurisdictions to restrain the use of deadly force, as well as on FBI
classification of burglary as a property crime rather than a crime of violence, and
statistics about the relatively rare association between violence and burglary.
1 8
Professionalism, classification, and statistical analysis are, of course, basic tools of
the modem administrative state.
Two terms ago, in Scott v. Harris,'9 the Court considered the use of
potentially deadly force-in this case, deliberately running into the suspect's car
during a high-speed chase-to stop a person who initially committed only a traffic
offense. Although the Court noted that a speeding car poses a larger threat than an
unarmed felon fleeing on foot, it refused to distinguish Garner on that ground
20alone. Instead, the Court appears to have changed excessive force doctrine by
treating Garner not as a case that created a rule for deadly force cases but instead
as "simply an application of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test" to a
particular set of facts.2' Thus, "[w]hether or not Scott's actions constituted
13 Cf Mitchell Dean, Powers of Life and Death Beyond Governmentality, 6 CULTURAL
VALuEs 119, 120 (2002) ("[I]t is a mistake to conflate the liberal theory or conception of the state
with modalities of the liberal government of the state").
14 MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNING SocIETIEs: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIc AND
INTERNATIONAL RULE 100 (2007).
IS 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
16 Id. at 3.
17 Id. at 8.
18 Id. at 10-11, 21.
19 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
20 Id. at 1777.
21 Id.
20081
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application of 'deadly force,' all that matters is whether Scott's actions were
reasonable.,
22
To determine reasonableness, the Court used the same balancing test of
individual and government interests. To assess the balance, the Court made two
important assertions. First:
We think it appropriate in this process to take into account not only the
number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was
respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in
danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high speed flight that
ultimately produced the choice between two evils that Scott
confronted .... By contrast, those who might have been harmed had
Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent.
23
Second, in response to Harris's argument that the police could simply have
stopped chasing him, the Court responded, "[w]e think the police need not have
taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott's action-ramming
respondent off the road-was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to
the public, ceasing pursuit was not."24 Indeed, "[a] police officer's attempt to
terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death., 25
The Court held, in short, that law enforcement officials are entitled to engage
in conduct that threatens a person's life if that conduct is reasonable. Among the
circumstances in which potentially deadly force will be reasonable is when the
victim is himself a wrongdoer who poses a threat to innocents. Further, the leeway
that officials have to respond in such situations-that is, the range of conduct that
courts will declare constitutionally reasonable-increases in response not only to
the number of people at risk but also to the relative guilt and innocence of the
wrongdoer and those at risk. Finally, the Court expressly linked its analysis to "the
choice between two evils," which is the language of the necessity defense, in
which otherwise illegal conduct is justified if it will avoid a greater harm. 6 That is
to say, Officer Scott's conduct was consistent with the Constitution, in part
because it was necessary. Necessity in this context is not simply a defense.
Rather, the idea of necessity in a case like Scott uses notions of emergency or
extremity to create or insulate state power and declare it reasonable, where it
would be unauthorized and unreasonable in normal circumstances. Any analysis
22 Id. at 1778.
23 Id.
' Id. at 1778-79.
25 Id. at 1779.
26 For discussion of the necessity defense, see John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity:
Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 HouS. L. REv. 397 (1999).
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that uses necessity to assess the constitutionality of official conduct should raise
eyebrows, and that is particularly true during a war on terror.27
A comparison of Garner and Scott plainly reveals change. The rule barring
deadly force against unarmed fleeing felons may no longer be a rule. At least for
now, the Court insists on treating each deadly-force fact pattern in the same
manner as other excessive force claims-as requiring a distinct application of the
reasonableness test-which suggests that deadly force claims have collapsed back
into general excessive force review.28 Similarly, Scott is more concerned than
Garner to safeguard or increase police discretion.
A focus on the doctrinal rule, however, masks the significant continuities
between the cases. Reasonableness remains the test, together with the balancing of
state and governmental interests. In other words, the structure of Fourth
Amendment excessive force doctrine remains the same. The Court's solicitude for
police professionalism, evident in Garner, also persists. In Scott, for example, the
Court suggested that the decision to hit Harris's car was not ad hoc, but rather
came in the course of considering whether to use something called the Precision
Intervention Technique maneuver.29  And three Terms ago, in Hudson v.
Michigan,30 the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of the
knock-and-announce rule, in part because the professionalism of police
departments leads them to take constitutional rights seriously and to instruct
officers in appropriate rules of conduct.
B. The Bus Sweep Cases: Bostick and Drayton
In Florida v. Bostick,31 the Court rejected a defendant's claim that he did not
voluntarily consent to have his luggage searched when police officers boarded a
bus on which he was riding. The Court recognized that Bostick did not feel free to
leave the bus during the stop, but that fact alone did not mean he had been seized
by the police-which would have made his interaction with them nonconsensual as
a matter of law. 32 Rather, "the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
27 For a corollary in the context of due process constraints on interrogation, see Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (noting due process prohibits conduct
that "shocks the conscience," which usually means conduct "intended to injure" and 'unjustifiable
by any government interest,"' and suggesting the need to obtain "key evidence" is a sufficient
government interest to justify otherwise conscience-shocking behavior) (quoting County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)). For the suggestion that using necessity analysis to
enhance government power is perilous, see Christopher L. Blakesley, Terrorism, Law, and Our
Constitution, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 471, 507-12 (1989).
28 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
29 Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007).
30 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006).
31 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
32 Id. at 435-36.
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encounter. 3 3 Of course, that inquiry turns on "all the circumstances surrounding
the encounter."
34
When Bostick argued that his consent could not have been voluntary because
no reasonable person in his situation-someone carrying cocaine in his luggage-
would consent to a search, the Court responded that "the 'reasonable person' test
presupposes an innocent person. 35  Finally, the Court stressed that "a bus
passenger's decision to cooperate with law enforcement officers authorizes the
police to conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant only if the cooperation
is voluntary. 'Consent' that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is
not consent at all."36
In United States v. Drayton,37 a 2002 decision involving a bus sweep in which
police did not inform people of their right not to consent to a search, the Court
used the same general analysis. But, as in Scott v. Harris, the Court took particular
care to stress that "for the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth
Amendment context., 38 What the Court meant was that requiring a police officer
to inform a person of his right to refuse consent would be an impermissible per se
rule. Rather than support a rule, the failure to provide this information is just "'one
factor to be taken into account.'
39
In the course of rejecting a clear rule and upholding the sweep, the Court
stressed the "cooperative" nature of the interaction between police and passengers:
"There was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming
show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no
command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. ' 4° The fact that the police
officer was armed and in uniform would not alarm the normal citizen because
"[o]fficers are often required to wear uniforms and in many circumstances this is
cause for assurance, not discomfort., 41 The same is true for guns. Because people
know that police are usually armed, "[tihe presence of a holstered firearm ... is
unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the encounter absent active
brandishing of the weapon. '
42
13 Id. at 436.
Id. at 437.
35 Id. at 438 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
36 Id.
3' 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
38 Id. at 201. In Bostick, the Court rejected the "per se rule" adopted by the lower court but
did not go out of its way to stress that such rules are undesirable; it simply determined that a fact-
specific reasonableness test provided a better method for resolving the case. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at
435-37.
31 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
40 Id. at 204.
41 id.
42 Id. at 205.
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Remember, too, that Bostick held that the reasonable person test "presupposes
a reasonable innocent person. ' 43 The final part of the Drayton opinion picked up
on Bostick's discussion of cooperation, voluntariness, and consent in the course of
describing what a reasonable innocent person would think when confronted by
armed and uniformed police officers: "[Blus passengers answer officers' questions
and otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers know
that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around
them."44 Indeed, the Court stressed that,
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should
be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full
accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the
rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for
the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange
takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.45
In many ways, Drayton is a case of continuity. The Court again rejected per
se rules in favor of assessing all the circumstances. And, after Drayton, it remains
the case-indeed it is more clear-that, as Bill Stuntz has observed, "if the officer
puts his command in the form of a question, consent is deemed voluntary and the
evidence comes in.'46
But Drayton also marks changes in tone and, more importantly, substance. In
tone, like Scott, it raises the intensity of the Court's insistence on balancing,
perhaps again to increase police discretion. Substantively, the Court did not
simply echo Bostick' s doctrinal discussion of voluntariness and consent. Instead, it
advanced a theory of consent to explain the doctrinal result. Consent has "weight
and dignity," but it derives from a relationship with lawfully exercised authority,
such that the act of consenting is almost a responsibility, and police are entitled to
rely on it. Further, the mere fact of interaction between citizen and police by itself
"dispels" inferences of coercion and reinforces the rule of law. This reinforcement
takes place under circumstances in which the pressure to exercise one's rights by
consent instead of by refusal is enormous, 47 which suggests that the Court's
43 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.
44 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205.
45 Id. at 207.
4 Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 3, at 1064. See also Margaret L. Raymond, The
Right to Refuse and the Duty to Comply: Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal
Procedure, 54 BuFF. L. REv. 1583, 1584 (2007) (suggesting Drayton is one of a line of cases that
"defines rules that place the responsibility to protect rights on the defendants themselves" and
"applies those rules so that the loss of rights is understood as the product of defendant-centered
decisions like consent, compliance, or voluntary cooperation rather than police conduct").
47 See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002
Sup. CT. REv. 153.
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conception of the rule of law-at least in the context of citizen-police encounters-
relies on waivers of rights that will be deemed consensual.48
To close off this part of my discussion, I think it likely that that the tonal
change in Drayton and the Court's theory of consent as cooperation with law
enforcement, which in turn produces the rule of law, reflect a post 9/11 anxiety
about security and proper citizenship.49 Yet even here, continuity remains, for
although these anxieties may have been heightened by the September 11 attacks,
they were not created by them. To the contrary, security and proper citizenship are
core concerns of modern liberal states, as the next section discusses.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS
The excessive force and bus sweep cases exhibit changes in tone and
substance. But those changes build on prior cases; they are not dramatic
departures. Even Scott, which rejected Garner's suggestion of a special set of
rules for deadly force, took care to claim consistency with Garner and to highlight
those aspects of the earlier case that stressed balancing in the service of
reasonableness. 50 In the more recent cases, the Court has come down heavily in
favor of doctrinal flexibility, but it had been doing the same thing in many cases
well before September 11.
This flexibility has been particularly apparent in cases denying rights-claims
by individuals, but that also has been true for quite a while. Rules, by contrast,
continue to emerge when they favor police discretion. Thus, the Court said in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista that "[c]ourts attempting to strike a reasonable
Fourth Amendment balance . . . [will] credit the government's side with an
essential interest in readily administrable rules."5' And in Scott, one passage of the
48 Drayton's conception of the rule of law has interesting implications for the warnings
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The rule of law may require criminal suspects
to be informed of their rights, but under Drayton it likely also depends upon the fact that the vast
majority of suspects (78% according to one study) waive their rights, often under circumstances that
are likely to be more coercive than a bus search. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
Revisited, 86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653-54 (1996).
49 See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]nyone who travels by
air today submits to searches of the person and luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft. It is
universally accepted that such intrusions are necessary to hedge against risks that, nowadays, even
small children understand," but insisting bus travel does not face the same risks). For similar
observations in the context of dog sniffs, see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417 n.7 (Souter, J.,
dissenting), 423-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (2005).
50 In effect, Justice Scalia's majority opinion did not interpret Garner at its most specific
level. Instead, he dealt with Garner at a higher level of generality, at the level of that case's
statements about reasonableness review, see Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8, rather than its specific
statements about the use of deadly force, see id. at 11-12; see also Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769,
1777 (2007). Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.)
(insisting on the need "to adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference" in substantive
due process cases "if arbitrary decisionmaking is to be avoided").
"' 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). "Often enough," according to the Atwater Court, "the Fourth
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majority opinion managed to describe the result of the reasonableness balancing
test as a "rule. 52 Doctrinal flexibility, in short, may be less a goal in itself than it
is a tool for achieving the more significant goal of police discretion.
Even more, in the excessive force cases the Court has placed greater emphasis
on the flexibility to take actions based on ideas of emergency and necessity, even
in cases that are more about public order (such as traffic regulation) than about
core criminal behavior. With the bus search cases, the relationship between
consent and rights has blossomed into a theory about the rule of law, and a practice
of disciplining citizens in the proper exercise of rights in confined but public
spaces-spaces that now seem always to have the potential to become disordered
or even to become sites of emergency.
To the extent these cases are representative, they can be seen as evidence of
an erosion of civil liberties and an increase in governmental power, with the
uncertainties of reasonableness review heightening the problem. Put more
theoretically, one might say with Giorgio Agamben that "the rationalities of
'public order' and 'security' in which the police have to decide on a case by case
basis define an area of indistinction between violence and right" that serves the
interests of sovereign power and supports the production of a political identity
based on what Agamben calls bare or naked life.53
But I think there is more to the picture. In both sets of cases, we also see
evidence of a development in criminal procedure doctrine away from what may
once have been a structure of juridical rights established by social contract to
control the sovereign, towards becoming a law of discretion, perhaps even a law of
administration or regulation. Rather than trumps against government action, rights
are factors considered in the formation of policing policy and the execution of that
policy.
I want to stress that the idea of criminal procedure rights being integrated into
the administrative state does not mean that they are disregarded. Individual rights
remain important, and they are taken seriously, but not always in an adversarial
way. Under the model of administration or expertise, we should not simply think
of rights, particularly criminal procedure rights, as being in tension with police
activity. Instead, we need to consider far more seriously the extent to which the
two work together, in the sense that both the consideration of rights by officials
and the exercise (or not) by individuals of rights serve the goals of policing. And
those goals, in turn, should be seen in both the narrow and the broader senses of
"policing"-not just enforcement of criminal law, but the creation of order at all
Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in
implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or
search is made." Id.
52 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779.
53 Giorgio Agamben, Sovereign Police, in MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS 103,
104 (Vincenzo Binetti & Cesare Casarino trans., 2000); see also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER:
SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998).
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levels of society, and even the production of freedom in some sense. And here we
return to the war on terror, because the goal of the police power as a tool of
governing is to manage community welfare by balancing respect for individual
autonomy with the security of the larger group. As Peter Ramsay notes, "[t]his
conflict of paradigms is a pervasive feature of a wide spectrum of contemporary
politics from smoking bans to the domestic aspects of the 'War on Terror."
54
Seen in this way, the idea of citizenship cannot take the form of autonomous
individuals acting in a pre-existing private realm that ordinarily remains at arms-
length from the coercive apparatus of the state. Ramsay suggests that "citizenship
supplies the immediate environment of the modern criminal law," such that legal
doctrines relating to potentially criminal conduct must develop "in a way
consistent with what the wider political culture regards as the proper relationship
between state and citizen, and between citizens." 55 I would go further. Citizenship
is neither pre-existing nor static. Rather, what it means to be a citizen depends
upon the practice of governing, on the interactions between people and
government. As a status, citizenship is dynamic, and just as criminal law and
procedure doctrine develops in relation to conceptions of citizenship, the idea of
citizenship develops in relation to practices of governance.
Indeed, criminal procedure rights may be an instance of what some writers
call "governing through freedom."56 That is to say, the rights that are thought to
mark spaces of liberty are part of the structure of governance and are not in tension
with it. The goal of governing is not to create or preserve liberty for its own sake
but rather to manage the state, so that rights are tools for achieving that goal. This
idea is most clear in Drayton, with its stress on the role of consent in mediating the
relationship between the exercise of rights and the exercise of police discretion.
But, it also comes through in Scott, where the Court emphasized Harris's personal
responsibility-that is, his status as an autonomous and individual political subject
making choices about his interactions with government officials. 57 Importantly,
Scott is a case in which we see the limits of governing through freedom in the
context of criminal law. Where people do not make good choices, where they
show themselves incapable of using their freedom to advance the interests of
54 Peter Ramsay, The Responsible Subject as Citizen: Criminal Law, Democracy and the
Welfare State, 69 MOD. L. REV. 29, 55 (2006); see also FOUCAULT, SECURITY, supra note 6, at 338-
41.
55 Ramsay, supra note 54, at 39-40.
56 DEAN, supra note 14, at 100-01; NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING
POLITICAL THOUGHT 72 (1999); Robert van Krieken, Crime, Government and Civilization: Rethinking
Elias in Criminology 4-5 (Sydney eScholarship Repository 2006), available at
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/916.
57 Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778; see also id. at 1775 (characterizing police as "forced" by Harris's
behavior "to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up").
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governance, then the traditional tools of sovereign authority-such as physically
violent action-remain available.
58
IV. CONCLUSION
Although law professors frequently criticize the results of the Supreme
Court's recent criminal procedure cases, I want to suggest that we need to think
more carefully about the relationship between criminal procedure rights and
techniques of governing, and that only when we have done so will we be in a
position to critique that dynamic.
Perhaps we should resist criticizing the results of cases like Drayton and Scott
on the ground that they increase the power of the state at the expense of individual
rights. Such criticisms assume simple trade-offs between rights and state power.
That is not the case, however, if rights are integrated in a meaningful way into the
process of governing, to achieve a calibrated assessment of all the relevant state
interests and advance the goal of a well-ordered, safe, and prosperous society-one
in which individuals typically will enjoy large spaces of freedom, even if that
freedom is contingent in significant ways. Or, if that prospect sounds distressing,
perhaps we should cease criticizing the Court for getting the balance of interests
wrong, and instead ask: is rational balancing of interests possible at all?; what turns
on the belief that it is?; and what alternatives are available?
At that point, we might be in a better position to assess the normative spin of
governing through freedom in the context of criminal procedure.
58 See DEAN, supra note 14, at 103-04; Barry Hindess, Politics as Government: Michel
Foucault 's Analysis of Political Reason, 30 ALTERNATIVES 389, 403-04 (2005).
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